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GROUP INSURANCE POLICIES: THE
EMPLOYER/INSURER AGENCY RELATIONSHIP
T HE SIGNIFICANT increase in issuance of group insurance contracts
in the past twenty years has established this type of coverage as an
important component of employee fringe benefits.1 Employers have found
that group insurance, providing low cost protection to employees, gen-
erally without a medical examination, can increase employee loyalty
and reduce labor turnover. Mass policy solicitations and renewals benefit
the insurer through reduced administrative costs, passed on in large part
to the insured group through lower premium rates.2 Precursory group
insurance plans maintained the traditional contractual relationship be-
tween the insurance company and the employee, allowing the employer
to perform only minimal clerical duties. Today, the pressures of com-
petition and rising costs have produced frequent delegation of administra-
tive detail by the insurer to the employer; and often the insurer has little
contact with the insured employee.3 This trend has advanced to the point
that in some cases the "insurer does little more than lend its name to the
program," accepting premiums and paying claims determined by the
employer, who is subject to an occasional cursory audit.4 Typically, the
master policy is issued in the name of the employer, and individual "certif-
icates" of insurance are subsequently distributed to qualifying employees.
Premiums are commonly paid from joint employer contribution and em-
ployee wage deductions. Eligibility for insurance, and even for claim
benefits, is often determined by the employer-master policy holder. With
the employer carrying out many of the administrative duties traditionally
performed by the insurance company, the extent to which an employer's
acts will bind the insurer has become of significant concern.
If the employer acts as the agent of the insurer, the insurance com-
pany will be bound by the employer's administrative mistakes.5 The im-
'In 1966 Group coverage amounted to more than $300 billion, equalling 35%
of all life insurance in force; 85% of all group policies were of the employer/employee
type. NsTITuTE oF LiFE INSURANCE, LIFE INsURANcE FACT BooK 26-27 (1966).
'See D. GP.Co, GRoup Ln INsu.ANcE 9-11 (1957).
'B. Swank, The Group Policyholder-Agent for Insurance Company or for
Persons Insured, P.4, October 12, 1965 (unpublished paper on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
'Id. at 4-5.
'See Piedmont Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Gunther, 108 Ga. App. 236, 238, 132
S.E.2d 527, 530 (1963); Baum v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 357 P.2d 960,
portance of this agency determination is well illustrated in the recent
California Supreme Court case of Elfstrom v. New York Life Insurance
Company.6 Elfstrom, president and majority stockholder of the Fullerton
Publishing Company, instructed his bookkeeper to secure company group
insurance for his daughter, a part-time employee of the firm. During an
ensuing prolonged absence of her employer, the bookkeeper, knowing
that the daughter's status was inadequate for coverage under the master
policy, completed a pre-signed application form requesting $4,000 cover-
age, and issued an insurance certificate with Elfstrom as beneficiary. In
accordance with established procedure, the application forms were re-
tained at the Fullerton headquarters with other group policy records.
Following the daughter's death some six months after the company began
premium payments on the policy addition, the insurer refused to pay the
policy benefits, contending that Miss Elfstrom had been ineligible for
insurance coverage under the terms of Fullerton's group policy. As-
serting that the bookkeeper had acted as the agent of the insurance
company, Elfstrom, as beneficiary, sued to recover the proceeds of the
policy. New York Life Insurance Company denied existence of an agency
relationship, and filed a cross complaint for recision of the insurance
certificate on the grounds that Elfstrom had concealed material facts.
7
The trial and appeals courts found that the bookkeeper, in procuring in-
surance for Elfstrom's daughter, was acting as her agent and held for
the insurer on the complaint and cross complaint.8 The California Su-
preme Court unanimously reversed, holding that an employer acts as
the agent of the insurer in performing functions necessary to administer
group insurance,9 but remanded the case for determination of the un-
answered issue of Elfstrom's intent.
Although most court decisions in the area of group insurance have
been limited to an examination of one or two aspects of the agency
relationship, there are sufficient state court cases to formulate the tradi-
tional pattern of majority and minority positions. The majority view,
that the employer is agent of his employees, 10 assumes that the employer
964 (Okla. 1960). See also F. MEcHmM, LAW OF AGENCY, §§ 129, 138 (1952);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 154, 282(2) (1958).
'--Cal. 2d- , 432 P.2d 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1967).
7 Id. at- , 432 P.2d at 734, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
8 Elfstrom v. New York Life Ins. Co.,---Cal. App.2d -, -, 56 Cal. Rptr.
601, 604 (Ct. App. 1967).
'--Cal. 2d at-, 432 P.2d at 737, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
"See Boseman v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196 (1937);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Quilty, 92 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1937); Metropolitan Life
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does not enter the insurance contract for the benefit of the insurance
company; rather, he is motivated by a paternalistic desire to benefit his
employees " or by desire to strengthen his business through better labor
relations.12 In administering the group policy the employer functions
as the representative of his employees; thus, the interests of the employer
and employee are aligned and adverse to that of the insurer.13 Finally, it
has been argued that because the insurer and employer are the contracting
parties, with the employer named as the policy holder, the employer
cannot logically function as the agent of the insuring company.14 The
minority view, finding an employer/insurer agency relationship,1 focuses
upon the employer's performance of the traditional insurer administrative
functions, and emphasizes the employee's lack of knowledge of and
Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 203 Ark. 1103, 160 S.W. 2d 852 (1942); Morales v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y, 115 Ind. App. 565, 60 N.E.2d 747 (1945); Continental Assur-
ance Co. v. Henson, 297 Ky. 764, 181 S.W.2d 431 (Ct. App. 1944); Wing v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 314 Mass. 269, 49 N.E.2d 905 (1943); Satz v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 225 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947); Duval v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
82 N.H. 543, 136 A. 400 (1927); Keane v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 22 N.J. Super. 296, 91
A.2d 875 (1952); Fidelity and Cas. Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 42 Misc. 2d 616,
248 N.Y.S.2d 559 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Boger v. Prudential Ins. Co., 259 N.C. 125, 130
S.E.2d 64 (1963); Layman v. Continental Assurance Co., 416 Pa. 155, 205 A.2d 93
(1964); Ralston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 90 Utah 496, 62 P.2d 1119 (1936).
But see Clauson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 195 F. Supp. 72 (D. Mass), alP d, 296 F.2d 76
(1st Cir. 1961); Patterson v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 27 IM. App. 2d 135, 169
N.E.2d 183 (1960); Carter v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 272 Ky. 392, 114 S.W.2d 496 (Ct.
App. 1938).
'See Duval v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 82 N.H. 543, 550, 136 A. 400, 404
(1927). But see Shears v. All State Life Ins. Co., 242 Ala. 249, 253, 5 So. 2d 808,
811 (1942).
"See I-Iroblak v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 50 Ohio L. Abs. 395, 403, 79
N.E.2d 360, 364 (Ct. App. 1947).
'See Duval v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 82 N.H. 543, 550, 136 A. 400, 404
(1927); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 42 Misc. 2d 616, 631,
248 N.Y.S.2d 559, 572 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
'See, e.g., Elfstrom v. New York Life Ins. Co.,-Cal. 2d- , - , 432 P.2d
731, 738, 63 Cal. Rptr. 35, 42 (1967).
'5See Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Dotson, 93 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.W.
Va. 1950); Piedmont Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Gunter, 108 Ga. App. 236, 132 S.E.2d
527 (1963); Rhodes v. Rhodes, 251 Iowa 430, 101 N.W.2d 1 (1960); Exstrum v.
Union Cas. & Life Ins. Co., 165 Neb. 554, 86 N.W.2d 568 (1957), afl'd on rehearing,
167 Neb. 150, 91 N.W.2d 632 (1958); Baum v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins, Co.,
357 P.2d 960 (Okla. 1960); Coker v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 188 S.C. 472, 199 S.E.
694 (1938); Vulcan Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Segars, 6 Life Cas. 2d 851 (Tenn.
1965); General American Life Ins. Co. v. Gant, 119 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Civ. App.
1938); Kaiser v. Prudential Ins. Co., 272 Wis. 527, 76 N.W.2d 311 (1956). But see
Prude v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 113 F. Supp. 215, 216 (S.D.W. Va. 1952);
Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 421 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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control over the actions of his employer, A number of states have
statutes that affix the agency label on parties conducting various aspects
of the insurer's business, 17 and courts occasionally have found these en-
actments determinative in the group insurance context.'8 No state has
undertaken a pervasive regulation of the problem,19 nor have insurers
attempted to settle the conflict by policy provision.20
Faced with the necessity of resolving the divergent positions taken
by courts applying California law to the agency question,2' the California
Supreme Court, in Elfstrom, noted that the employer administering a group
plan acts both in furtherance of his interests and for the benefit of his
employees. 22 Since the employees, in the court's view, were the real
parties-in-interest, with all the incidents of ownership usually associated
with a life insurance policy, the court rejected the argument that by nam-
ing the employer beneficiary of the master policy an agency relation-
ship was made conceptually impossible. Adjudging the issue of control
to be determinative of the agency question, the California court con-
cluded that employees have neither effective knowledge of, nor control
over employer administration of a group insurance plan. The insurer, on
the other hand, directs the actions of the employer and has the power
to exercise effective administrative control; thus, in administering a group
policy the employer acts as agent for the insurer,23 who will be bound
by the employer's acts.
The imposition of the agency burden upon the insurance industry
may, as the Elfstrom court has indicated,24 precipitate additional costs
' E.g., Clauson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 195 F. Supp. 72 (D. Mass.), afl'd, 296
F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1961); Neider v. Continental Assurance Co., 213 La. 621, 35 So. 2d
237 (1948).
'
T See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 56-8016 (1960) (one who solicits policyholder is
agent of insurer); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1302 (1958) (same); Tnx. INS. CODE
art. 21.02 (1963) (receiver or collector of premiums is deemed agent of insurer).
"SE.g., Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Dotson, 93 F. Supp. 538, 540
(S.D.W. Va. 1950); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Speer, 185 Ark. 615, 618, 48
S.W.2d 553, 554 (1932); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Hall, 253 Ky. 450, 452,
69 S.W.2d 977, 978 (1934); General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Gant, 119 S.W.2d 693,
695 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
'"But see MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 24.14416 (1960) (financial institution, as group
creditor, shall not act as agent for insurer).
I But see note 27 infra and accompanying text.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dorman, 108 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1939);
Eason v Aetna Life Ins. Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 607, 28 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1963).
- Cal. 2d at- , 432 P.2d at 737, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 41 (1967).
Id. at- , 432 P.2d at 737, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
Id. at- , 432 P.2d at 738, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
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and higher premiums. Yet, continued functioning of group insurance
plans in states adopting the minority rule tends to show that this burden
is not economically destructive. Further, because it focuses upon capacity
to prevent future errors and abuses, rather than upon alignments of in-
terests and motivational factors, as does the majority rationale, the minority
approach has been viewed as the more equitable.25 Another analysis
which may be useful to the courts would result from an investigation of
the nature of the particular administrative task involved. The degree
of discretionary delegation involved, the scope of possible insurer control,
and the adversary posture of the employer toward the insurer when un-
dertaking a particular task may be relevant factors in assessing the re-
lationship connate to the undertaking. Thus, delegated clerical duties,
such as receipt and forwarding of applications, recording of beneficiaries,
and collecting of premiums, would imply an insurer/employer agency re-
lationship because they are susceptible to a high degree of control and
align the interests of employer, employees, and insurance company. On
the other hand, discretionary duties such as determination of claims;
termination of policies; dissemination of information concerning policy
provisions, employment status, and premium payments; or waiver of policy
provisions, may not imply agency. Although the insulating effect of policy
provisions relating to the agency question has been definitively treated,20
the insurer might nonetheless minimize the agency threat by establishing
procedures designed to confirm the employer's position as representative
of his employees. Appropriate contract provisions might encompass such
matters as reserving to the insurer determination of employee eligibility
and requiring regular audits of the employer's records and procedures.2 7
Yet, irrespective of attempts by the insurer to avoid the agency relation-
ship, it appears that the present trend toward self-accounting and self-
administered group insurance policies portends continued close scrutiny
of the employer/insurer relationship.
1 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 55 (1965).
2See Blue Cross-Blue Shield v. Fowler, 43 Ala. App. 572, 580, 195 So. 2d 910,
918 (1966), cert. denied, 280 Ala. 708, 195 So. 2d 919 (1967).
1 B. Swank, supra note 3, at 51-53.
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